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Friday, 11 October 2024

On Reading the Initial Report (3 May 2024): Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions

Reading the Initial Report of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic institutions,  I quickly realized that this report was cross-referenced with the Special Report on Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions prepared by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, and the CSIS Institutional Report.  However, here is a list of the characters (agencies, institutions, plans) involved in the ongoing investigations, inquiries, regulations and reporting.  (My focus is the preliminary report but the Committee hearings are ongoing [broadcast on CPAC] until October 16, with a new report scheduled for the end of the year.):


  • Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS”)

  • Communications Security Establishment (“CSE”)

  • Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”)

  • Global Affairs Canada (“GAC”)

  • Privy Council Office (“PCO”)

  • Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections (“OCCE”)

  • Elections Canada

  • National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

  • National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (“NSIA”) 

  • Prime Minister's Office (PMO)

  • Deputy Ministers Committee on Operational Coordination (DMOC) 

  • Electoral Security Coordination Committees (ESCC) 

  • Deputy Ministers Intelligence Committee (“DMIC” )

  • Assistant Deputy Ministers committee (ADM NS Ops) 

  • The Caretake Convention

  • The Plan to Protect Canadian Democracy ("The Plan")

  • Security and Intelligence Threats to Election Task Force (“SITE TF”)

  • Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (“CEIPP”) 

  • Panel of Five


What Is foreign interference?

Most of these agencies are self-evident and/or already well known to Canadians.  Much of the report describes each of these institutions and committees and details how this network of agencies operates in relation to one another.  The report attempts to address the most obvious questions of the Canadian public and, at the same time, explain what is and isn't "foreign interference."  The Commissioner writes:

It may seem easy to draw the line between (legitimate) foreign influence and (illegitimate) foreign interference. Diplomacy, and even aggressive attempts to influence other countries, are legitimate when they are done in the open and do not involve threats to individuals or groups. Foreign interference is different because it is covert or threatening. But there is often a grey zone: foreign actors may use established, legitimate channels to engage in covert activities to advance their national interests. Also referred to as “malign influence”, this form of foreign interference is difficult to detect because it uses channels that are generally understood as acceptable.

As reported, no crimes were committed and foreign influence did not impact the results of the elections under investigation--2019 and 2021.  What is the substance underlying the outcry of foreign interference in Canadian elections?

The Substance

The "Substantive Chapters" of the Report (4 to 8) cover definitions and reflections on institutionsal responses.  The cases where foreign interference might be suspected are covered in chapters 5 and 6.  Within these chapters, six instances of suspected foreign interference are described:

1.  A suspicion that foreign students (possibly coerced by the Chinese Consulate) were bused to a Liberal nomination meeting in Don Valley in which Han Dong was chosen.

2. In the 2019 election, 11 political candidates and 13 staffers were suspected of having "a connection to" or being "affected by" the activities of Chinese "threat actors."  [The expression "threat actors" is used thirteen times in the report but it is never defined.]

3.  In the 2021 election, "inaccurate reports" about Erin O'Toole, the Conservative Party leader, were circulated on Chinese-language media outlets.  [For some additional context see:  On Reading "The Uyghur Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention"]

4.  In the 2021 election, "false narratives" circulated on Chinese-language media about Conservative Party MP Kenny Chiu's "proposal to implement a foreign influence registry." Mr. Chiu also claims he was shunned by Chinese-language media.

5.  In Vancouver East, NDP candidate Jenny Kwan believes she has been the target of foreign influence because she has been critical of China and "since 2019 she has ceased being invited to certain key events organized by Chinese communities’ organizations."

6.  There are indications that India and Russia may have given financial support to "preferred candidates" without the candidates' knowledge.

Solutions in search of a problem

When I consider the massive security and surveillance apparatus being brought to bear in response to so few examples and such slim, insubstantial evidence of wrongdoing, my conclusion is that we are witnessing a pyramid of solutions in search of a problem.  "Covert and threatening" might sound nefarious but isn't it obvious that every country in the world tries to influence other nations when it suits their purposes?  Isn't this what happens everyday in the United Nations?

McCarthyism in Canada?

It is an exaggeration to compare what's happening in Canada to McCarthyism, but the blacklisting of Han Dong certainly bears similarities to that unfortunate period of American history.  Dong won election in the federal Don Valley riding twice--2019, 2021--with over 50% of the vote in both cases.  Dong was forced to resign from the Liberal caucus and claims to have received death threats.  He is currently suing Corus, the parent company of Global News, the source of the accusations against him.  The judge in Dong's civil trial has ruled that "the defendants [Corus/Global] have no tangible and no documentary" evidence.  The judge further commented that "As a consequence of the story, Dong's reputation and life in politics were destroyed."

Does the right hand know what the left hand has been doing?

Please, dear reader, take a look at this Government of Canada web site:  Consulting Canadians on a possible Canada-China free trade agreement. The Canadian government was considering a free-trade agreement with China and actively soliciting Canadians to join in the process at the same time that anyone consorting with Chinese officials, diplomates or citizens, would become an object of CSIS/CSE/RCMP suspicions (not to mention numerous other agencies in the list above).

The Elephant in the room

According to the Report, a relatively small number of "threat actors" have been investigated:  China, Russia, Iran, India and Pakistan.  Are these the "actors" most likely to influence and have an impact on Canadian elections and democratic institutions?  What about the elephant in the room next door?

Dark Money

In Dark Money:  The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right, Jane Mayer describes in detail the network of billionaires organized by the Koch brothers to infiltrate and manipulate every level of American politics with a goal of promoting a Libertarian agenda including, most particularly, to counter environmentalists and government efforts to limit climate change.  Mayer's focus is the USA but, of course, the Koch brothers, as the owners of Invista and the Pine Bend refinery, are major players in the Canadian economy.  As David Sassoon pointed out in 2012,  "This single Koch refinery [Pine Bend]  is now responsible for an estimated 25 percent of the 1.2 million barrels of oil the U.S. imports each day from Canada's tar sands territories" (p. 90, qtd in Dark Money).  Is anyone investigating the influence of Koch Industries and Americans for Prosperity on Canadian politics, or is the busing of students to a Liberal nomination meeting the only issue that really matters?

Not so long ago we came close to electing an American citizen as Prime Minister of Canada:  see There's Hypocrisy, and Then There's Scheer Hypocrisy

In our eagerness to preserve and defend individual rights and democratic values, we must be cautious not to abandon exactly those rights and values.




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